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This paper proposes a framework to examine the comovements of asset prices with seemingly 
unrelated fundamentals, as an outcome of the optimal portfolio strategies of large institutional fund 
managers. In emerging markets, the dominant presence of dedicated fund managers whose 
compensation is linked to the outperformance of their portfolio relative to a benchmark index, and 
of global fund managers whose compensation is linked to the absolute returns of their portfolios, 
leads to portfolio decisions that result in systematic interactions between asset prices even in the 
absence of asymmetric information. The model endogenously determines the optimal portfolio 
weights, the incidence of relative value versus macro hedge fund strategies, and how prices can 
systematically deviate from the long-term fundamental value for long periods of time, with limits to 
the arbitrage of this differential. Managerial compensation contracts, while optimal at a firm level, 
may lead to inefficiencies at the macroeconomic level. We identify conditions when a shock to one 
emerging market affects another market. 
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The phenomenon of financial contagion has achieved considerable attention in both academic 
and policy circles in recent years.  The tequila crisis of 1994-95, the Asian crisis of 1997, the 
Russian default and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, the boom and bust 
related to the internet bubble in the late 1990s, the response of international markets in the 
immediate aftermath of September 11, and the run-up to the Argentine debt default in late 2001, all 
were accompanied by the transmission of financial market volatility across borders.  In the case of 
emerging markets, the prices of assets of countries which were not related through direct 
macroeconomic links (e.g. trade channels, linked exchange rates, or vulnerability to similar 
commodity prices) showed comovements in excess of what could be explained through traditional 
macroeconomic linkages. 
  The literature on contagion can broadly be classified into its empirical and theoretical strands.  
The empirical strand has focused on definitions of contagion to account, for instance, for 
simultaneous increases in volatility which show up as increased correlations, or the impact of 
common external factors.  The theoretical strand has tried to identify the possible channels of 
contagion, including the herding behavior of investors, the transmission of panic, and automated 
risk management procedures.  We will focus on contagion as a transmission of a negative or 
positive shock to another country where financial markets are not linked by economic fundamentals 
but affected by the behavior of different types of fund managers to parameters such as index 
weights, volatility of the returns of the assets, the level of risk aversion, and trading strategies. 
  Policy approaches to contagion have relied mainly on the argument that informational 
asymmetry drive excess comovements of prices as investors watch each others’ actions and often 
tend to reinforce each others actions.  This has prompted calls for greater disclosure both of market 
positioning and key financial and economic data from countries vulnerable to contagion.  In a 
related vein, policymakers and researchers have also focused on the role of particular investor 2  
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groups in driving market prices.  Particularly after the Asian crisis, hedge funds and other highly 
leveraged institutions were the subject of much debate on the causes of contagion and policies were 
targeted at reducing the sources of contagion from such sources. 
   A key assumption in much of the literature is that the main financial markets are efficient and 
that contagion is a deviation from the norm.  This could be driven by information asymmetry, 
market manipulation through size, or the destabilizing effects of leverage.  This paper aims to 
analyze the phenomenon of contagion by showing that the institutional structure of markets can 
play a significant role in creating market architectures that may lead to contagion.  
  In particular, the incentives fund managers face can lead to contagion even in a market with no 
asymmetric information dominated by certain classes of institutional investors—a key feature both 
of emerging debt markets as well as major equity markets.  The different compensation mechanisms 
of different classes of fund managers, themselves an outcome of optimal principal-agent 
relationships between fund managers and their clients, are a root cause of deviations of asset prices 
from what may be the efficient market outcome.  This also suggests that asset prices may continue 
to significantly deviate from underlying “fundamentals” and the behavior of fund managers is 
optimally guided not just by the fundamentals, but by their expected compensations for taking on 
risky positions.  We find that given the domination of markets by distinct types of portfolio 
managers, who are distinguished by their mandates and compensation mechanisms, the optimal 
responses of these investor classes to the same information set and market conditions vary 
considerably.  While groups of investors behave in well-defined ways in response to shocks, we 
find the impact on equilibrium market prices and fund managers’ rebalancing of their portfolio 
weights based on the type of shock and the relative sizes of the two fund manager classes, and the 
initial conditions in the market. 3  
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  While our model was motivated by emerging markets, this framework can also be used to 
analyze comovements in prices in different assets within the borders of the same country, for 
example between stocks and the bond market.  A key conclusion that emerges from this paper is 
that managerial compensation systems are a key source of distortions in financial markets, and may 
be the source for long-term deviations of prices from the so-called fundamentals.  This also leads to 
the conclusion that the opportunity to arbitrage away such deviations may be limited for long 
periods of time, and markets may be over- or undervalued and be perceived as such for extended 
periods. 
  We consider two types of fund managers—dedicated and opportunistic—in our model.  
Dedicated managers are compensated based on deviations from an emerging market index and are 
not allowed to borrow cash or short any asset.  Opportunistic managers are compensated based on 
the absolute return on their portfolio and are allowed to short any asset and borrow cash.  First, we 
derive the optimal weights for each asset for each type of investor.  We find that dedicated investors 
tend to rebalance their portfolios towards the index when asset volatility or their risk aversion 
increases.  We also find that opportunistic managers decrease the amount of leverage in response to 
increased asset volatility or increase in risk aversion.  Second, we derive equilibrium expected asset 
returns and prices.  We find that a demand shock in one asset affects the expected price of the other 
asset.  Specifically, we find that the relative contribution of one type of trader to contagion depends 
on underlying market conditions. 
   The paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides a brief overview of the literature.  
In section II, we present the basic framework of the paper and discuss features of the demand 
functions of three types of fund managers.  In section III, we calculate equilibrium prices and 
investigate the impacts of changes in parameter values.  Section IV offers some concluding 
thoughts. 4  
  4
I.   Literature  Review 
  Our paper best fits in the theoretical literature about contagion where the reallocation of assets 
by investors is not necessarily based on market fundamentals.
1  Calvo and Reinhart (1996) 
distinguish between fundamentals-based contagion and “true” contagion where channels of 
potential interconnection are not present (also see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998).  We define 
contagion as the propagation of a shock to another country’s asset when there are no fundamental 
linkages between the country hit by the shock and the other countries and the comovement of asset 
prices across borders based on the behavior of global investors. 
  Calvo and Mendoza (2000) suggest that information regarding investments in a portfolio may be 
expensive and investors may choose to “optimally” mimic market portfolios.  They find that 
financial globalization in an environment of imperfect information may increase contagion where 
investors face high costs to gather information on market fundamentals and rely on the actions of 
other investors.  
  Kyle and Xiong (2001) construct a continuous-time model with two risky assets and three types 
of traders—noise traders, long-term investors and convergence traders.  When convergence traders 
suffer large capital losses in one market, they liquidate positions in both markets.  The liquidation of 
the portfolio amplifies and transmits the shock from one asset to another.  Contagion in their model 
is generated through the wealth-effect of convergence traders. 
  Kodres and Pritsker (2002) construct a multiple asset model to study contagion through cross-
market rebalancing when one country faces an idiosyncratic shock.  Countries may be weakly 
linked in terms of macroeconomic risks.  They also find that asymmetric information increases a 
country’s vulnerability to contagion. 
                                                 
1 Some of these models discuss herd behavior as a possible explanation.  For a general discussion about herd behavior, 
see Banerjee (1992) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990). 5  
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  Schinasi and Smith (1999) suggest an alternative view to contagion from those based on market 
imperfections such as asymmetry of information.  They construct a partial equilibrium framework 
to study different portfolio management rules and rebalancing events and their effects on contagion.  
They find that a shock to an asset in one country may have effects on risky assets in other countries 
because of the underlying portfolio management rules and the parameterization of the joint 
distribution of asset returns.  Furthermore, they find that rebalancing may be affected by whether or 
not the investor is leveraged.  Leveraged investors will reduce their exposure to risky assets if the 
return on the leveraged portfolio is less than the cost of funding. 
  In this paper, we extend the literature by considering the case where investors optimally 
rebalance their portfolios based on an idiosyncratic shock to one market in terms of increased 
volatility and a demand shock to an emerging market asset potentially resulting in contagion.  
Unlike the previous literature, we focus on the managerial incentives of fund managers and their 
role in dampening or exacerbating contagion.  Fund managers are often restricted in the amount that 
they can invest in emerging markets.  In addition, they may also be compensated on the relative 
return on the portfolio to the emerging market index.  We consider two types of international fund 
managers, dedicated and opportunistic fund managers which are discussed in detail below. 
     
II.  The Model  
We will consider a simple discrete time model with two risky emerging market assets (A and B) a 
mature market asset (Z), and cash (M).  The emerging market and mature market assets can be 
viewed as long-term bonds. There are three types of traders: dedicated emerging market fund 
managers (investing in only emerging market assets and cash), global opportunistic fund managers 
(investing in emerging markets and mature markets), and noise traders (local investors).  Risk 
averse managers will attempt to maximize their risk-adjusted compensation. 6  
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  Local Investors trade in asset A or asset B, and do so based on conditions in other asset markets 
in that country. They do not invest outside of their respective country.  For the purposes of this 
model, local investors are noise traders adding a random element to the demand of assets A and B. 
  Dedicated fund managers allocate their capital between two risky assets A and B and a risk-free 
asset (cash), and can only invest in these assets (their mandate does not allow investing in the 
mature market asset Z).  The compensation of dedicated fund managers is tied to the performance of 
the funds under their management relative to the benchmark index for emerging market assets.
2  
  Opportunistic fund managers are allowed to invest in all three assets A, B and Z.  While their 
main investment universe is defined as mature market assets, they have the opportunity to invest in 
the emerging market asset class to enhance their overall returns. Thus, their decision is whether to 
invest a small amount of their portfolio in emerging market assets or mature market assets. 
Opportunistic mangers may either increase or reduce their exposure to assets A, B and Z depending 
on the relative returns/volatilities of mature and emerging market assets.
3  Asset Z can be 
interpreted as a risk-free asset such as U.S. Treasuries with fluctuations in secondary market prices.  
Unlike dedicated managers, opportunistic managers may sell assets short to finance long positions 
in other assets.
4   
    Since comprehensive data on the composition of the investor base is difficult to compile, we 
rely on the evidence presented by international banks who are the main market makers for emerging 
market debt, in gauging the relative size of investor classes.  The total sovereign emerging bond 
market universe investible by international investors is estimated at some $225 billion.  While the 
                                                 
2 Typical benchmarks are the JP Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) and EMBI Global indices. 
3 Such investors are often linked to broader indices such as the Lehman Universal or Lehman Aggregate or Salomon’s 
Broad Investment Grade (BIG) index. 
4 We allow for short selling to examine the behavior of hedge funds as one type of global investor. 7  
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size of outstanding bond market capitalization is somewhat larger, the above estimates exclude 
smaller and illiquid sovereign bond issuances, and emerging market corporate issuances of about 
$100 billion, and others not meeting the criteria for inclusion in the major market indices.  Of this 
pool of available assets, between 40-50 percent is thought to be held by dedicated investors 
including both emerging market mutual funds as well as emerging market funds managed 
independently but belonging to a larger family of funds.  Hedge funds typically comprise between 
10 and 20 percent of the investor base.  The remainder is dominated by global investors who either 
invest in the whole emerging markets index or who selectively and opportunistically “cross over” 
into emerging markets.  Direct retail investors do not form a significant proportion of overall 
emerging market investor bases.  
A.  The Investment Horizon 
For the purposes of modeling portfolio managers’ behavior, we consider a time horizon consisting 









Period 0 is the initial period, where fund managers begin with a certain portfolio allocation, and a 
certain knowledge of prices and returns, which is an outcome of the previous period’s portfolio 
decisions and shocks.  They then update their information set  0 I  in this period based on which they 
form their expectations of the future demand of local investors for each asset, and the variance 
(distribution) of all assets.  Based on that, in a rational expectations framework, they make a 
decision on their new optimal portfolio, based on expectations of the variables. 
 Period  T is when portfolio managers, based on  0 I  and their initial conditions, put in place their 
new portfolios, and when the realization of the random variable takes place. The actual outcome of 8  
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equilibrium prices and returns in period T will be the result of the realization of the random variable 
on the new portfolio positions.  These equilibrium prices have to be compared against the prices 
under alternative scenarios to analyze the dynamics of contagion.  Since expected returns are the 
inverse of prices, as will be shown, the allocation of a proportion of a portfolio to an asset will help 
determine its price, and hence expected return.
5 
 Period  T+1 is a terminal condition on prices.  The terminal condition is significantly beyond the 
time period, we focus on in the model.  The terminal price is based on asset and economy-wide 
fundamentals is fixed and known.  These assets may be viewed as long-term bonds where the 
terminal payout is known but the price in secondary markets fluctuates. 











The model will be based on the rates of return of various assets, which is the inverse of their prices. 
The model will determine the total demand for each asset, and set that against a fixed supply of each 
                                                 
5 The derived demand curves can be seen as analogous to an auction mechanism wherein investors put in their bids for 
assets along a price schedule, and depending on the equilibrium price will be allocated a particular amount of the asset. 
0 I
0  T
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asset to determine equilibrium prices.  Note that the rates of return will be computed as the 
difference between the equilibrium prices determined in the model and the terminal prices.  
B.  The benchmark index 
Let 
I r  denote the return on the benchmark portfolio in period (T +1) as:                                             
 















  (0,1) α ∈ . 
As is usually the case, fund managers take α  as given exogenously, as the weights of the 
components of the index are determined by the proprietor of the benchmark index, and are only 
modified periodically.
6 
C.  Local Investors as the Source of Uncertainty 
Local investors add uncertainty to the demand (and hence equilibrium prices) of assets A and B. 



















Note that the only source of uncertainty for each asset is the demand for assets by the local investor. 
D.  Dedicated Fund Manager’s Compensation Structure  
Let 
D r  denote the net return on the portfolio held by the index investors from period T to period (T 
+ 1), where λ  is the proportion of their wealth invested in asset A and τ  is the proportion of their 
                                                 
6 An extension of the model could study the effects of changes in benchmark weights in a longer-time horizon model. 
7 We assume for simplicity that the both assets share the same distribution properties though not necessarily the same 
parameters. 10  
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wealth invested in asset B, with (1 ) λ τ −− being the proportion invested in cash. Then, the net 
return on the dedicated manager’s portfolio is: 
  () ( ) ( ) 1( )









































D I rr −  denote the total excess return of the dedicated fund manager’s portfolio at time (t +1). 
The excess return is defined as the return of the managed portfolio over a portfolio which simply 
tracks the market index.  The fund manager’s compensation is a fixed proportion k of the excess 
return she earns for the portfolio, and her utility is increasing in his expected income and decreasing 
in the variability of his income (with (a) denoting the coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion). 
Assuming that each fund manager’s initial portfolio value is normalized to one, the dedicated fund 
manager’s optimization problem is as follows: 
{ }
, max [ ( )]
DI kE U r r
λτ − , 
where: 
(( ) ) ()
DI DI a r r Ur r e
−− −= −  
and 
1
([ [ ] [ ] )
2 [( ) ]
D ID I aEr r a V a rr r DI EU r r e
−− − −
−= − . 
The excess return of the portfolio is given by: 
() ( 1 ) ( 1 )
D IA B M rr r r r λα τ α λτ −=− +− + + − − .  11  
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Then, 
 () ( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1)
D IA B M Er r Er Er r λα τ α λτ −= − + − + + − −   
and 
  ( )
22 22 () ( ) ( 1 )
DI
AB Var r r λ ασ τ ασ −=− + − + .  
The return on cash is a known constant 
M r .  To isolate the effects of index-linked investing on 
comovement of asset prices, we will assume that  ( , ) 0
AB Cov r r = , i.e. we assume there is nothing 
inherent in asset prices of A and B that already has contagion incorporated in it.   
  Maximizing the expected utility of wealth (since the fund manager gets a fixed percentage k of 
the excess returns on the portfolio, he will maximize his utility by maximizing the excess returns on 
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Note that dedicated managers are not allowed to short either asset A or B, or borrow cash. 
  The dedicated fund managers’ demand space for assets A and B is diagramed in figure 2. When 
cash holdings are zero, the manager is on the diagonal line. When cash holdings are positive, the 
manager is below the diagonal line.  Because dedicated managers are not allowed to short either 
asset or borrow cash, their allocations are bounded from below by theλ  and τ axes.  If the manager 
is underweight asset A but overweight asset B, then she will be in the triangle labeled I.  If the 12  
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manager is overweight asset A and underweight asset B, she will be in the triangle labeled III.  If she 
is underweight both assets she will be in rectangle II.  Even if the manager knows an asset is likely 
to bring negative returns, the compensation and indexation structure results in her holding some 
amount of the asset under certain conditions as elaborated below. 
 












Proposition 1: The solution of the dedicated fund manager’s optimization problem (2.2) is as 
follows:
8  
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For these parameter values, cash holdings are zero. The investor will be along the “no-cash” line 
in Figure 2 above. 
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 Proposition  1  demonstrates that the index weights α and 1 α − are key determinants of a 
dedicated managers portfolio allocation towards an asset.  Other things equal, a country with a 
greater weight in the index will automatically get a greater allocation of funds in an optimal 
behavioral framework.  Note also that the deviation of the allocation from the index weight is 
independent of that weight.  
  In proposition 2, we state the behavior of dedicated managers when one or both emerging 
market assets underperform cash. 
Proposition 2:  
Suppose that the risk-adjusted excess return of an emerging market asset underperforms cash: 
a)  If  ()
AM Er r >  and  ()
BM Er r < or  ()
BM Er r >  and  ()
AM Er r < , the manager will go overweight 
asset that outperforms cash.  Conversely, if  ()
AM Er r < or  ()
BM Er r <  or both, the manager will 
be underweight asset A (λ α < ) and/or asset B (( 1 ) ( 1 ) λ α − <− ), but will not necessarily hold 
zero of either asset.  
b)  As the weight of asset A in the benchmark index α  rises, a manager who is overweight the asset 
will increase her exposure further by maintaining the overweight.  A manager who is 
underweight asset A will also increase her exposure, but maintain the underweight. 
c)  As the risk aversion coefficient (a) rises, the demand for asset A or B falls, if the manager is 
overweight the asset.  If the manager is underweight the asset, an increase in (a) results in her 
reducing her underweight position.  In other words, a higher degree of risk aversion causes 
“hugging of the index.” 
d)  As
2
A σ  or 
2
B σ  rises, the demand for asset A or B falls if the manager is overweight the asset.  If 
the manager is underweight the asset, as 
2
A σ  or 
2
B σ  increases, the manager reduces her 15  
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underweight.  In other words, an increase in 
2
A σ  or 
2
B σ  results in greater “hugging of the 
index.” 
e)  An increase in (a),
2
A σ  or 
2
B σ , may reduce the demand for cash and greater hugging of the index. 
  Proposition 2 states that dedicated managers may hold positive values of an emerging market 
asset even when it underperforms cash.  Intuitively, it is easy to see that while lower weights to an 
asset with lower returns than cash would increase utility, the low weight relative to the benchmark 
increases the risk of underperforming the index and hence lowering utility.  For some ranges, the 
return element dominates and hence a zero allocation may be optimal, but in other ranges, the risk 
element dominates leading to a positive allocation.  
  This result can be easily generalized to more than two emerging market assets.  When the 
dedicated manager rebalances her portfolio weights closer to the index, the demand for all assets 
where she was underweight will increase and the demand for all the assets where she was 
overweight will decrease.  Thus, the behavioral characteristics of the dedicated investor results in 
linkages between otherwise unrelated markets based on whether the portfolio weight is greater or 
less than the market index.  
  Proposition 2 also states that dedicated managers tend to hug the index more closely when 
volatility of returns on emerging market assets and risk aversion increase.  If the manager is 
underweight an asset and the volatility of that asset increases, she will increase her holdings of that 
asset.  Interestingly, dedicated managers reduce their cash holdings when volatility and risk 
aversion increase.   
  Now let’s consider the case when both emerging market assets outperform cash.   16  
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Proposition 3:  
Let us consider the case when 1 λ τ += .  
a)  The dedicated manager is overweight the asset with the higher expected return and is 
underweight the asset with the lower expected return. 
b)   An increase in risk aversion coefficient (a) would result in “hugging of the index” or 
allocations closer to the index. If the manager is underweight an asset, an increase in (a) would 
result in the dedicated manager increasing her exposure of that asset and decreasing her 
exposure of the other asset.  Similarly, if the dedicated manager is overweight an asset an 
increase in (a) would result in a decrease in exposure of that asset and an increase in exposure 
of the other asset. 
c)  An increase in
2
A σ  or 
2
B σ  reduces the size of the overweight/underweight positions as well, 
forcing the dedicated manager to move closer to the benchmark index.  
  When dedicated managers do not hold cash, they increase their holdings of an underweight asset 
when its volatility increases and decrease their holdings of the other emerging market asset.  In 
other words, an increase in the volatility of an underweight asset results in a decrease in the demand 
for the other emerging market asset when there are only two assets.  If there are more than two 
assets, the demands for all the underweight assets vis-à-vis the index increase while the demands for 
all the overweight assets decrease.  In this sense, an increase in the volatility of one asset spills over 
into the demand for the other asset.  
  Propositions 2 and 3 state that changes in the expected returns, level of risk aversion, and 
variance of the emerging market assets may lead to changes in the demand for the underlying assets.  
We also find that increases in
2
A σ , 
2
B σ  or (a) would result in managers choosing allocations closer to 
the index.  
E.   Global Opportunistic Managers 17  
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In this subsection, we consider opportunistic fund managers that maximize their expected portfolio 
value from holding assets A, B, and Z and do not follow any index or benchmark.  The global 





O r is the return on the opportunistic fund manager’s portfolio, 
O W is the initial wealth of the 
opportunistic manager, j is the percentage of compensation for the opportunistic manger,φ  is the 
proportion allocated to asset A, δ is the proportion allocated to asset B, and (1 ) φ δ −− is the 
proportion allocated to asset Z.  The return on the opportunistic manager’s portfolio is: 
(1 )
OAB Z rrr r φδ φ δ =++ − − . 
The return on the mature market index, 
Z r , is stochastic and exogenous for the opportunistic 
manager.
9  
() () ()( 1 ) ()
OAB Z E rE rE r E r φδ φ δ =++ − −  
and 
22 22 22 () ( 1 )
O
AB Z Var r φ σδ σ φ δ σ =++ − − . 
As before, we will assume that all covariance terms are zero.  The opportunistic fund manager 
maximizes the following problem with respect to φ and δ : 
22 22 22






φδ φ δφ δφ σ δ σ φ δ σ ⎡ ⎤ ++ − − − + + − − ⎣ ⎦ . (2.3) 
Unlike the dedicated manager, the opportunistic manager is allowed to short any asset to finance 
positions in other assets. 
Proposition 4: 
                                                 
9 The mature market asset can be interpreted as a return on mature market bonds where the opportunistic investor is a 
price taker. 18  
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The solution of the opportunistic fund manager’s optimization problem (2.3) is as follows.  The 
optimal portfolio weights 
** * (,, ( 1 ) ) φ δφ δ −− are:  
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AB AZ BZ U σ σσ σσ σ =++. 
  Now let’s consider some behavioral characteristics of opportunistic managers to changes in 
parameter values. 
Proposition 5: 
The opportunistic manager reacts to changes in the underlying parameters in the following ways: 
a)  The opportunistic manager will hold increasing amounts of an emerging market asset if the 
expected return on that asset increases. This increase in exposure will come at the expense of 
her exposure to both the other emerging market asset and the mature market asset.  
b)  The proportions of reallocation away from the other emerging market asset and from the 
mature market asset will depend on the relative volatilities of the two assets. If the emerging 
market asset is more volatile than the mature market asset, then the reduction will be greater for 
the mature market asset, and vice versa. 19  
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c)  If  () ()
BA Er Er > and  () ()
M A Er Er > , the opportunistic manager would short asset A and go 
long at least one other asset that has higher positive expected returns if:  
222 2 () () () ()
BA ZA
Z BB Z







This is the relative value strategy (also known as the long-short strategy) of hedge funds. Note 
that returns do not have to be negative to short the asset, just less than that of the other two. 
d)  If  () ()
AB Er Er > and  () ()
AM Er Er > , the opportunistic manager would go long asset A. If 
() ()
AB Er Er > and  () ()
M A Er Er > , then the manager will short asset A if: 
222 () () () ()
AB ZA
Z BZ Er Er Er Er a σ σσ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −< − − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
e)  As (a) increases, the opportunistic manager would reduce her exposure to the highest yielding 
asset, and increase her exposure to the lowest yielding asset.  
  As can be seen, the opportunistic investor may hold negative quantities (i.e. go short) of both 
emerging market assets if the expected return on mature market asset is sufficiently high relative to 
emerging market assets and the product of the volatilities of the other emerging market asset and the 
mature market asset are sufficiently low.  Conversely, the investor may short the mature market 
asset if emerging market assets offer sufficiently high expected returns.  The opportunistic manager 
may also go long one emerging market asset and go short the other, a strategy commonly employed 
by relative value hedge funds.  Similarly, we observe that shorting the mature market asset implies 
taking a leveraged position in emerging markets, with the optimal amount of such leverage given 
above.  In real life, the mature market asset return in such a case would be the cost of borrowing for 
the hedge fund.  Again, the amount of leverage would be endogenous and a function of the cost of 
leverage.  As the cost of leverage rises, overweight positions in emerging markets assets are reduced 
ceteris paribus, which is consistent with the evidence that a rise in global interest rates induces a 20  
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selloff in emerging markets often based purely on technical considerations of reduction of leverage 
in the market. 
 
III.  The Equilibrium 
  In the previous sections, we derived the optimal behavior of two main classes of fund managers 
in emerging market bond markets, namely dedicated emerging market managers and global 
opportunistic managers. We will now compute the equilibrium returns (and implicitly prices) that 
are derived from the interaction of these two classes of managers.  
  For dedicated managers, their compensation mechanism is linked to the performance of their 
portfolio relative to a benchmark portfolio.  Most dedicated investors are benchmarked to either the 
EMBI+ or the EMBI Global index.  In equity markets, they are typically benchmarked to Morgan 
Stanley Capital International Emerging Markets Free index.   
  Hedge funds and the proprietary desks of commercial and investment banks act like the global 
opportunistic managers described above.  They essentially are focused on the absolute risk-adjusted 
returns of their portfolios, and have access to both emerging and mature market assets, and can go 
long or short assets, thereby allowing significant expansions of their balance sheets.  What we see 
from the model is that such managers look at the relative risk-adjusted returns for all assets.  The 
main determining factor for their positioning, including whether to go long or short any asset, is 
their expected excess return over other assets they can invest in, for given levels of volatilities. 
Therefore, whether they will treat two emerging market assets similarly or differently will depend 
on how the returns compare with that of the mature market asset in a three-asset case.  
Defining contagion as a comovement of asset prices (and hence returns) in the same 
direction, and reverse contagion as the offsetting movements (in the opposite direction) of two asset 
prices, contagion can be analyzed by comparing the returns on the two assets when subject to a 21  
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shock.  The shocks of particular interest are when investor expectations of local traders in a 
particular country changes and its effect on the expected return on the other emerging market’s asset 
via the trading strategies of cross-border managers. 
  The impact on emerging market bond prices from the interaction of dedicated and opportunistic 
managers can be seen from the computation of equilibrium prices.  For this, we set the total demand 
of assets A and B from two types of managers equal to their respective supplies and compute 
equilibrium prices. Suppose that there are n number of dedicated investors and q number of global 
investors.  When dedicated and opportunistic managers along with local investors are present, the 
market clearing conditions are: 
,, , D AO A L A
A S n Dq DD =++      (3.1) 
,, , D BO B L B
B S n Dq DD =++      (3.2) 
, D A D ,
, D B D ,
, OA D and ,
, OB D are the demands for assets A and B, respectively, by dedicated investors 
and opportunistic investors, respectively.  As before,
, LA D  and 
, LB D  are demands for assets A and B, 
respectively, by local investors and
A S  and 
B S  are fixed supplies of assets A and B, respectively.   
 
A.  Dedicated (positive cash holdings) and Opportunistic Managers 
Now, we consider the equilibrium expected returns for assets A and B when there are dedicated 
managers that hold cash in their portfolios and opportunistic managers.  Substituting the optimal 
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Rearranging equations (3.3) and (3.4) and solving for  ( )
A Er and ( )
B Er , yields : 
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⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ++ + − ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (3.6) 
 
Proposition 6: If dedicated and opportunistic managers along with local investors comprise the 
types of investors demanding assets A and B, the effects of changes in the expectations of local 23  
  23
investor demand will affect the returns (and prices) of both assets, leading to contagion from one 
country to another.  
 
  In other words, if local investors are expected to buy assets in country A (or B), portfolio 
rebalancing will force equilibrium prices of both assets A and B to rise and their expected returns to 
fall.  Conversely, if local investors are expected to sell assets in country A (or B), equilibrium prices 
of both A and B will fall.  This is a simple yet powerful result that shows that local investors in one 
market can impact prices in assets in countries unrelated through fundamentals, with the 
propagation of contagion arising purely from the investors in the market. 
  We are able to also study the magnitude of each type of manager’s contribution to expected 
prices in the market with the shock and the market without the shock.  While the total effect of a 
reduction in demand of either asset results in a decrease in the price of both assets, the magnitude of 
the fall in price depends on the type of investor.  If q (no opportunistic managers) is equal to zero, 
we see from equations (3.5) and (3.6) that neither asset is affected by a change in expected demand 
of local investors of the other asset.  In other words, when at least one emerging market asset 
underperforms cash, portfolio rebalancing by dedicated managers does not lead to contagion or 
reverse contagion.  However, from equations (3.5) and (3.6), we observe that the rebalancing of 
dedicated managers rebalancing from an expected change in the local investors’ demand affects the 
price of that asset more than the opportunistic managers.   
  The model also predicts that the equilibrium expected price for both assets falls when there is an 
increase in the expected return of the mature market asset.  Intuitively, all else equal an increase in 
the return of the mature market asset would result in an outflow of emerging market assets.  We 
observe in equations (3.5) and (3.6) that if q = 0, then a change in the expected return of the mature 
market asset does not affect the expected price of either asset.  While this result is not surprising 
given that dedicated managers are not allowed to invest in mature market assets, it illustrates that 24  
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restricting fund managers’ set of investments can also have affects in markets that would otherwise 
be unrelated.  
B.  Dedicated Manager (zero cash holdings) and Opportunistic Manager 
In the section, we study the equilibrium expected prices when dedicated managers do not hold 
cash.  Substituting the optimal portfolio allocations to each asset for each type of investor and 
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Solving for the expected returns for assets A and B yields: 
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Proposition 7: If dedicated and opportunistic managers along with local investors  comprise the 
types of investors demanding assets A and B, changes in the expectations of local investors demand 
for an emerging market asset will affect the returns (and prices) of both assets, leading to contagion 
from one country to another.  
Unlike the previous equilibrium result, both dedicated managers and opportunistic managers 
contribute to contagion.  We observe that the coefficients of the local investor demand of the other 
asset has n and q in equations (3.7) and (3.8) implying that both managers portfolio rebalancing 
results in contagion.  Unlike the previous case, the contribution to contagion by the dedicated 
manager is greater than the opportunistic manager.  Furthermore, the impact of changes in the local 
investor demand of an asset on its own price is affected more by the opportunistic investor.   
  The equilibrium analysis has shed light on the macroeconomic effects of trading strategies 
of fund managers.  We observe that underlying relationships between the risk-adjusted expected 
returns of a set of assets affects the contribution of each type of manager to contagion.  Our model 
suggests that it is difficult to isolate a particular type of player that would increase contagion.    
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IV. Conclusion 
  This paper develops a model for modeling the investment strategies of two main classes of 
investment managers—dedicated and opportunistic—in emerging markets and their interaction in 
determining the equilibrium prices of financial assets.  It demonstrates that the aggregation of 
optimal micro-level behavior of fund managers leads to market equilibria that may deviate from 
what efficient markets may suggest, even in the absence of asymmetric information or regulatory 
distortions.  In particular, assets of countries unrelated by fundamental economic links or even by 
common external shocks may become related through the channel of managers’ optimizing 
behavior and the trade-offs they face.  This suggests that contagion is often linked to the 
institutional structure of markets.  
  This paper makes a few key points which are consistent with market practioners experience in 
the comovement of asset prices and its link with the investor base.  First, different types of 
investment managers with different investment objectives have differential impacts on price 
dynamics in asset markets even in the absence of informational asymmetries or transactions costs. 
Second, the presence of incentives for fund managers can lead to the systematic deviation of prices 
from their long-term fundamentals with no room for arbitraging away the difference.  Third, the 
presence of leveraged investors who can both go long and short has a significant impact on market 
valuations, as well as on price dynamics as the cost of that leverage increased.  Fourth, while 
common external factors are also shown to have impacts on two emerging market assets, pure 
contagion arising from noise trading in one country spilling over to another country not linked 
through macroeconomic fundamentals is an outcome of the optimal behavior of international 
investors.  Fifth, one type of fund manager does not always create more cross-border contagion than 
another type.  Our model predicts that both types of managers may contribute to contagion.  In sum, 
this paper concludes that fund manager’s compensation and investment systems bear in them the 27  
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seeds of contagion arising from “technical” factors, and do not eliminate all sources of contagion 
even in the presence of full information. 
  The framework of this paper could be applied to other markets dominated by institutional 
investors, such as markets within one country.  For example, the interaction between high-yield 
fund managers and broader fixed income managers, and between equity managers and comingled 
stock and bond fund managers, could shed further light on the comovement of seemingly unrelated 
equity prices or high-yield bonds, and their interaction with broader bond market prices. 
  Policy responses that improve the efficiency and transparency of markets, as well as those that 
help cope with volatility, will alleviate but may not eliminate the phenomenon of contagion.  Areas 
of future research could focus on the optimal incentive contracts for different classes of fund 
managers, as well as the optimal construction of market indices as benchmarks for managerial 
compensation.  28  
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
 
The Lagrangian for the optimization problem for the dedicated investor can be written as follows: 
() ( )
22 22
() ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 )
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The complementary slackness condition and the non-negativity constraint for the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the “no borrowing constraint” are: 
(1 ) 0 and  0. ϕ λτ ϕ − −= ≥ 
Thus, if the constraint does not bind, i.e.  1 λ τ + < , then the multiplier must be  0 ϕ = . Alternatively, 
if the multiplier is positive  0 ϕ > , the constraint must be binding, i.e.  1 λ τ + = . 
Suppose that  0 ϕ > and  1 λ τ += . The optimal value of ϕ can be derived as: 
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Cash holdings will be zero because 1 λ τ += . 
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This condition holds only if the expected return on at least one of the emerging market assets is 
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Finally, we need to verify that the value of the objective function  ( )
** ** , V λ τ  is indeed greater than  
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The value of the objective function when  0 λ = , 0 τ =  is:  
() ( ) () () ( ) ( )
22 22 1
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and the value of the objective function when  0 λ >  and 0 β > : 
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We know that 0 λ >  and  0 τ > , then: 
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which holds by assumption. 
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which holds by assumption.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
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The behavioral characteristics of dedicated managers to changes in parameter values are 
summarized as the following: 
a.  If  ()
AM Er r > or ()
BM Er r > , the manager will go overweight asset A (λ α > ) or asset B 
((1 ) (1 ) λ α −> −), respectively. Conversely, if ()
BM Er r < or ()
BM Er r < , or both, the 
manager will be underweight asset A (λ α < ) and/or asset B (( 1 ) ( 1 ) λ α − <− ), but will not 
necessarily hold zero of either asset.  
From equation (3.12), we observe that if the  ( )
AM Er r > and ( )
BM Er r < , λ α > . If 
()










− < . 33  
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Similarly, if  ( )
BM Er r > and ( )
AM Er r < , the dedicated manager is overweight asset B 
( (1 ) τ α >− ), as seen in equation (3.13). If  ( )
BM Er r < , the dedicated manager holds 











− <− . 
b.  As the weight of asset A in the benchmark index α  rises, a manager who is overweight the 
asset will increase her exposure further by maintaining the overweight. A manager who is 
underweight the asset will also increase her exposure, but maintain the underweight.  
From equation (3.12), if α increases so does λ .  If λ α > , the first term in equation (3.12) is 
positive.  If α increases, the manger increases her holdings of asset A.  If λ α < , the first 
term in equation (3.12) is negative, the manager increases her exposure to asset A but 
λ α < still holds.  Similarly, an increase in α would lead the manager to decrease her 
holdings of asset B as seen from equation (3.13).  If the manager is underweight or 
overweight asset B, the manager maintains the underweight or overweight. 
c.  As the risk aversion coefficient (a) rises, the demand for asset A or B falls, if the manager is 
overweight the asset. If the manager is underweight the asset, an increase in (a) reduces the 
underweight.  
As (a) increases the magnitude of the first term in equations (3.12) and (3.13) decreases 
confirming that as (a) increases, the manager will rebalance her portfolio towards the index. 
 
d.  As 
2
A σ  or 
2
B σ  rises, the demand for asset A or B falls if the manager is overweight the asset. 
If the manager is underweight the asset as 
2
A σ  or 
2
B σ  increases, the manager reduces her 
underweight.  34  
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From equations (3.12) and (3.13), as 
2
A σ  or 
2
B σ  increases, the magnitude of the first term 
decreases confirming that a manager will rebalance her portfolio towards the index. 
e.  An increase in (a), 
2
A σ  or 
2
B σ  ,may reduce the demand for cash resulting in greater hugging 
of the index.  
From equation (3.14), we observe that (1 ) λ τ − − is only positive when  ( )
AM Er r < or 
()
BM Er r < . The partial derivative of (1 ) λ τ − − with respect to (a) is: 
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when ( )
AM Er r < and ( )
BM Er r < . 
Equation (3.15) is also negative when  ( )
AM Er r < and: 
22 22








Finally, equation (3.15) is negative when  ( )
BM Er r < and: 
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The partial derivative of (1 ) λ τ −− with respect to
2
A σ  is: 
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The partial derivative of (1 ) λ τ −− with respect to
2
B σ  is: 
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Thus, increases in (a), 
2
A σ  or 
2
B σ  may result in a reduction of cash holdings by managers 
under certain conditions.  
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
When the sum of the risk-adjusted excess returns on emerging markets is positive, the optimal 





























.     (3.17) 
a.  The dedicated manager overweights the asset with the higher expected return and 
underweights the asset with the lower expected return.  
I f  () ()
AB Er Er > , the first term on the right hand side of equation (3.16) is positive and 
similarly the first term on the right hand side of equation (3.17) is negative. 
b.  An increase in (a) would result in allocations closer to the index. If the manager is 
underweight an asset, an increase in (a) would result in the manager increasing her 
exposure of that asset and decreasing her exposure of the other asset.  Similarly, if the fund 
manager is overweight an asset an increase in (a) would result in a decrease in exposure of 
that asset and an increase in exposure of the other asset.  
In equations (3.16) and (3.17), the first term on the right hand side (the magnitude away 
from the index) decreases in magnitude implying that the manager would rebalance towards 
the index allocations. 
c.  An increase in 
2
A σ  or 
2
B σ  reduces the size of the overweight/underweight positions, forcing 
the manager to move closer to the benchmark index.  36  
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In equations (3.16) and (3.17), the first term on the right hand side decreases in magnitude as 
2
A σ  or 
2
B σ  increases confirming that managers would rebalance towards the index 
allocations. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
The opportunistic manger solves the following optimization problem: 
22 22 22
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Solving for the optimal portfolio allocations,
* φ , 
* δ , and 
* (1 ) φ δ −−  yields: 
 
22








⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −−














⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −−
=+ + ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
, (3.20)   
and 
22










−− =− + − + ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥
⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
,          (3.21) 
where:  
22 22 22
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Proof of Proposition 5: 
a.  The opportunistic manager will hold increasing amounts of an emerging market asset if the 
expected return on that asset increases.  
The partial derivatives of φ  and δ  with respect to  ( )
A Er and ( )
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Confirming that as  ( )
A Er and ( )
B Er , the manager increases her allocation of that asset in her 
portfolio. 
This increase in exposure will come at the expense of her exposure to the other emerging market 
asset and the mature market asset.  
Let’s consider an increase in  ( )
A Er . The partial derivatives of δ  and (1 ) φ δ −−  with respect 
to ( )
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confirming that an increase in  ( )
A Er will result in the opportunistic manager reducing her 
allocation to the other two assets.  
b.   The proportions of reallocation away from the other emerging market asset and from the 
mature markets will depend on the relative volatilities of the two assets. If the emerging market 38  
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asset is more volatile than the mature market asset, then the reduction will be greater for the 
mature market asset, and vice versa.  
As can be seen from equations (3.19)-(3.21), the coefficient of the terms in the demand function 
relating to the returns of the assets are 
2
A σ , 
2
B σ  and 
2
Z σ . Suppose for example in equation (3.19) 
that ( )





times the change in ( )






 times the change in  ( )
A Er  will come from asset Z. If 
22
BZ σ σ > , then it can be 
seen that more of the reallocation will be from Z and less from B. If 
22
BZ σ σ = , the reduction in 
demand for assets B and Z will be identical. 
c.    If  () ()
BA Er Er > and ( ) ( )
M A Er Er > , the opportunistic manager would short that asset A and 
go long at least one of the assets with higher expected returns if: 
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 Plugging in condition (3.22) into equation (3.19), yields: 
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, 
confirming that the manger will short the asset when condition (3.22) is satisfied. We 
demonstrate that the opportunistic manager will take a long position in part d. 
d.  If  () ()
AB Er Er > and  () ()
AM Er Er > , the investor would go long asset A. Plugging these 
conditions into equation (3.19), yields  
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confirming that the manager will be long asset A. 
If  () ()
AB Er Er > and  () ()
M A Er Er > , and lower than the mature market asset, then the 
manager will short asset A if: 
222 () () () ()
AB ZA
Z BZ Er Er Er Er a σ σσ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −< − − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
Plugging this condition into equation (3.19), yields: 
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, 
confirming that the manager will be short asset A. 
Conversely, the manager would be long asset A only if: 
222 () () () ()
AB ZA
Z BZ Er Er Er Er a σ σσ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −> − − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
e.  As (a) increases, the opportunistic manager would reduce her exposure to the highest yielding 
asset and increase her exposure to the lowest yielding asset.  
The partial derivative of φ  with respect to (a) is: 
22
22
(( ) ( ) ) (( ) ( ) )
() ()
AB AZ
ZB Er Er Er Er
aa U a U
σσ φ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −− ∂
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.   (3.23) 
Suppose ( ) ( )
AB Er Er > and ( ) ( )
AZ Er Er > . Now, equation (3.23) will be negative confirming 
that increases in (a) would result in the manger reducing her holdings of asset A. Alternatively, 
suppose ( ) ( )
BA Er Er > and ( ) ( )
M A Er Er > . Now, equation (3.23) will be positive confirming 
that increases in (a) would result in the manger increasing her holdings of asset A. 
Proof of Proposition 6: 
If dedicated and opportunistic managers along with local investors comprise the types of investors 
demanding assets A and B, the effects of changes in the expectations of local investor demand will 
























, a decrease in the expected demand of local investors of a given 
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Proof of Proposition 7: 
If dedicated and opportunistic managers along with local investors  comprise the types of investors 
demanding assets A and B, changes in the expectations of local investors demand for an emerging 
market asset will affect the returns (and prices) of both assets, leading to contagion from one 
country to another.  
Differentiating with respect to the expected return of an asset with respect to the change in local 
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